This article explores the effects of the bonus cap rule on UK banks' remuneration practices with a view to evaluating its likely impact on the financial incentives faced by senior managers to make risky business decisions. The main argument is that the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is only one of the factors that determine the intensity of financial incentives for UK bank managers to make risky decisions. More crucially, the steps taken by major UK banks to evade the effects of the cap by introducing fixed pay allowances, which are paid in shares but are legally structured as fixed remuneration, have created additional risk-taking incentives. Indeed, it is shown that paying part of executive remuneration in shares as such, rather than partly determining the amount of remuneration based on corporate financial performance, is a significant driver of risk-taking. It follows that there is no reason to believe that the bonus cap has achieved any improvement in bank senior managers incentives and, therefore, that EU law's emphasis on the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is misplaced.
I. Introduction
The 4 th Capital Requirements Directive, known as CRD IV, 1 contains a controversial provision setting an upper limit to the amount of variable remuneration bank senior managers can receive as a function of their fixed remuneration (the bonus cap rule). Unsurprisingly, this provision has been opposed by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which has noted that the significant increase in fixed remuneration, as a result of the new rule, is likely to weaken banks in times of crisis, as earned fixed remuneration cannot be clawed back. 2 In a similar vein, in September 2013 the Treasury brought an unsuccessful legal challenge against the bonus cap rule on the grounds of lack of competence by the European Union to legislate in the area.
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This article explores the effects of the implementation of the bonus cap rule on UK banks' remuneration practices and risk-taking incentives for bank senior managers. The ultimate aim is to assess whether the new rule is likely to change financial incentives in a way that is conducive to lower risk-taking, thus enhancing the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions. In doing so, the discussion draws on the law and economics school of thought, neoclassical economics and behavioural economics, which will be used to explore the likely effects of the new rule on the behaviour of senior managers. As such, it adds to the existing literature not only on executive remuneration but more broadly, as the insights regarding the relationship between external financial incentives created by legal rules and risktaking are relevant to a broad range of issues in corporate law and financial regulation.
The main argument advanced herein is that the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is only one of the many factors that determine the intensity of financial incentives for UK bank managers to take decisions which are optimal for bank shareholders but increase banks' 4 | P a g e insolvency risk (and, more broadly, their risk of failure). Strictly speaking, neither the amount nor the ratio of variable remuneration per se matter, but rather pay-performance sensitivity, for which the ratio of variable to fixed remuneration is not necessarily a good proxy. More crucially, the steps taken by major UK banks to evade the effects of the cap by introducing fixed pay allowances, which are paid in shares but do not depend on performance and hence are legally categorised as fixed remuneration, create additional financial incentives for senior bank managers to increase banks' risk of failure. Indeed, it is shown that paying part of executive remuneration in shares in itself, rather than determining part of the amount of remuneration on the basis on corporate financial performance, is probably the main driver of risk taking.
Despite the forthcoming withdrawal of the UK from the EU in 2019, critical engagement with CRD IV remains practically relevant, as it is a piece of EU law with EEA relevance and will thus still apply to the UK if it joins the European Economic Area, 4 or reaches any type of agreement that preserves single market access for UK financial institutions. The rule is also of considerable academic interest, as it showcases the challenges associated with using command-and-control regulation 5 to regulate senior executive remuneration.
The article is structured as follows. Part II provides a brief doctrinal exposition of the bonus cap rule and the broader framework of regulatory rules on the structure of executive 4 The European Economic Area was established by the Agreement on the European Economic Area, signed in 5 | P a g e remuneration in banks. Part III establishes that the main policy rationale for the bonus cap rule is to strengthen financial stability, rather than to protect bank shareholders against excessive remuneration, or to curb the amount of remuneration. Part IV puts forward a conceptual framework of the relationship between remuneration structure and risk-taking in light of empirical economic research. Part V presents evidence from major UK banks documenting their response to the bonus cap rule. Based on these findings, Part VI evaluates the overall impact of the rule on financial stability. Part VII concludes.
II. A brief doctrinal analysis of the bonus cap rule and of the framework of structural rules on executive remuneration in banks
The purpose of this section is to examine the CRD IV provisions which regulate the ratio between fixed and variable remuneration. 6 It will also explain how this rule fits within the broader structural regulatory framework applicable to executive remuneration in UK banks. As a preliminary point, it is worth noting that, in all large companies, fixed remuneration includes an executive's salary, pension contributions, and benefits in kind. Variable remuneration typically includes two types of remuneration: annual bonus awards which depend on a manager's performance during the relevant year; and awards of shares under Long-Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) which vest after a period of time (usually three to five years) subject to the achievement of certain performance conditions. 7 6 CRD IV rules on remuneration are implemented in the UK via the PRA Rulebook and FCA Handbook. As this article focuses on major banks which are regulated by the PRA, all references will be to the PRA Rulebook.
7 For a detailed discussion of the various components of senior executive remuneration, see MT Moore, 'Design unless the shareholders approve a higher rate, up to 200%. 10 The Directive prescribes the procedure to be followed in detail. Shareholders must be given reasonable notice and must be provided with a detailed statement on the impact of the proposed increase in variable pay on the bank's ability to maintain a sound capital base. In addition, the resolution approving the increase must be passed by at least 66% of the share capital provided that at least 50% of the shares are represented at the meeting, or by 75% of the share capital. Any shares held by individuals who are personally affected by the decision (e.g. directors or managers) are disqualified from voting.
In parallel, the Directive enables Member States to allow banks to apply a discounted rate to up to 25% of total variable remuneration 11 provided that it is paid in instruments that 8 The Directive defines its scope of application as covering all material risk takers including 'senior management, risk takers, staff engaged in control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that takes them into the same remuneration bracket as senior management'. See CRD IV, article 94 (2). The exact scope of the CRD Evidently the new rule presupposes a clear distinction between fixed and variable types of remuneration. This has become a major regulatory policy issue due to the use of a new type of ostensibly fixed remuneration by UK banks, typically described as fixed pay allowances or role-based allowances. As will be seen in Part V, these allowances are paid in shares which cannot be sold for a period of time. Unsurprisingly, the European Banking Authority was not convinced that they constitute fixed remuneration and sought to constrain their use. The relevant guidance asserts that all elements of remuneration are for the purposes of the Directive either fixed or variable and it is each bank's responsibility to decide the nature of each component of its executive pay package. Any type of remuneration which is described by an institution as fixed, but is in any way conditional on past or future performance or can be 12 See EBA, 'Guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate for variable remuneration ' (27 March 2014) EBA/GL/2014/01 <https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/remuneration/guidelines-on-discount-ratefor-variable-remuneration>.
13 Ibid, 22. 8 | P a g e unilaterally altered during an employee's term of employment, is, in fact, variable remuneration for regulatory purposes. The competent national authority must thus ensure that banks do not evade the overall ratio by using remuneration which is essentially variable but purports to be fixed. 14 This has led major UK banks to remove one feature of their fixed pay allowances, namely the explicit provision that the amount of the allowance is to be reviewed annually, which was typical in 2014 -immediately after the coming into force of the new rule. 15 Still, the EBA guidance does not restrict the possibility of altering an element of a remuneration package by individual renegotiation of the terms of an employment contract and thus flexibility in this regard is not totally lost. Also, nothing prevents banks from entering into yearly contracts of employment with senior management.
To appreciate the likely impact of the bonus cap provision from a UK perspective it is expedient to offer an overview of its immediate context i.e. the broader remuneration framework for UK banks. This framework was not extensively reformed by the CRD IV The policy rationale behind the CRD IV cap on performance-based remuneration is exactly to undermine incentives for senior managers to take risks that may lead to the failure 33 of a financial institution, by reducing their financial benefits from such risk-taking, even regarding risks that are optimal for shareholders. This reflects the fact that mechanisms which can be effective in attenuating the shareholder-manager agency problem are not well-placed to prevent excessive risk taking from the taxpayers' perspective. 34 Indeed, the stated purpose of the Directive's approach to remuneration is to reduce financial incentives to engage in excessive risk taking, which is perceived as one of the main causes of bank failures and financial instability generally. For instance, the preamble of the Directive states that:
institutions/compensation/> accessed 4 February 2018, discussed in E Ferran, 'New Regulation of Remuneration in the Financial Sector in the EU' (2012) 9 ECFR 1, 4 -14.
33 Bank failure is a much broader notion than insolvency in the sense of the Insolvency Act 1986, s 122. Indeed, bank failure is defined in section 37 (9) - (10) Weaknesses in corporate governance in a number of institutions have contributed to excessive and imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector which has led to the failure of individual institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally.
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The Directive then identifies excessive levels of variable remuneration as one such weakness, 36 and asserts that a mandatory upper limit with regard to the ratio between the two forms of remuneration ought to be imposed. conclude that the management teams of these institutions earned as a group more than $1 billion in variable remuneration, which greatly exceeds their losses when the two institutions failed.
There is also empirical evidence from American retail banks that in the years leading up to the financial crisis the remuneration of CEOs was made more responsive to performance so as to create stronger incentives for CEOs to exploit new (risky) opportunities, and that CEOs responded positively to these incentives by taking more risk. odds with the both the theoretical understanding of the risk neutrality of diversified investors and with the empirical evidence reviewed in the previous paragraphs, as the cap explicitly seeks to undermine the alignment of incentives between senior managers and bank shareholders by discouraging the former from taking risks that are optimal for the latter. So, we would expect all banks to secure a nearly unanimous approval to extend the cap to 200% which, as will be shown in the next part of the article, was the case in the UK. It follows that the Directive's emphasis on shareholder voting as a gatekeeper is misplaced and misses the point of the fundamental misalignment between shareholder interests and the public interest. If it is thought that a cap of 100% is necessary -which the argument herein by no means supports -then it would make sense to dispense with the possibility of extending it with shareholder approval.
IV. A conceptual framework on remuneration structure and risk taking
Until 2009 all major UK banks were companies whose share ownership was separated from their control, having no shareholder with a controlling stake. This changed for the banks that received government support in 2009 as a result of the financial crisis. Of the two major banks that received such support, the Government has now disposed of all its shares in Lloyds, but has retained a majority stake in RBS, which is however managed on a commercial basis.
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The main purpose of executive employment contracts in widely-held companies is to attract and retain talented individuals and provide them with incentives to pursue shareholder 50 The government's investment has taken place through a separate corporate entity, the UK Financial Investments The standard model describes human decision-making based on three fundamental assumptions, namely: that individuals are rational, selfish and possess unlimited willpower.
The notion of rationality in this context is a subject of much debate. The core minimum of the notion of rationality refers to 'choosing the best means to the chooser's ends' 55 which entails comparing the cost and benefits of various potential courses of action in terms of the utility and disutility they bring to the individual in question and making the choice that maximises his utility. In a broader sense, frequently used by economists, rationality is also defined to mean that an individual's preferences comply with the axioms of completeness (all possible outcomes are ranked), transitivity (if outcome A is preferred over outcome B and B is preferred over C then A is preferred over C), monotonicity (if positive outcomes are bundled the individual will prefer the bundle that contains more of at least one outcome and no less of any other) and convexity (in ranking various bundled outcomes the individual will prefer averages rather than extremes). 56 In the broadest sense, rational preferences are defined as coherent, 54 The forthcoming discussion, however, will not examine the literature on the impact of board psychological dynamics on the amount of executive remuneration, due to the scope of this article. In the case of decisions made under risk or uncertainty, the standard model assumes that rational individuals seek to maximise their expected utility which is calculated using Bayesian statistics. A positive net expected value means that the expected future benefits arising from a given decision outweigh the expected future losses, the relevant figures being calculated based on the probability distribution of all potential outcomes. Most crucially, rational choice models assume that individuals are risk averse which is a consequence of the axiom of diminishing marginal utility which applies inter alia to wealth. The degree of risk aversion of each individual will depend on the shape of their utility function. This means that an individual will always prefer -say -to gain £10 rather than to be given a 50% chance of gaining £20 (or zero) and to convince them to accept the risky option the expected gain will have to be higher than the gain under the risk-free option. Of course, risk-aversion reduces significantly or even disappears if an individual has the option of taking a risk multiple times, as sophisticated individuals are aware of the law of large numbers, according to which the actual ratio of outcomes will converge on the theoretical, or expected, ratio of outcomes, as the number of experiments increases. This explains the anecdote related by Thaler involving a colleague of him refusing to take a bet on a coin where he would either gain $200 or lose $100 but proposing instead to take 100 bets in which case he expected to win $5,000 and the chance of him making a loss would be extremely small. The apparent inconsistency of preferences (rejecting one bet but accepting 100 bets) was described by Thaler as irrational, 59 arguably 57 E Shafir and R LeBoeuf, 'Rationality' (2002) (WW Norton & Company, 2015), 192 -195. wrongly so, as it is in line with the mathematical definition of probability, which is only applicable to repeated phenomena. 60 In any case, this indicates that diversified equity investors will tend to be risk-neutral regarding risk-taking by investee companies i.e. they will prefer the option with the highest expected value, irrespective of risk. In the case of decisions, the outcomes of which occur in the future, the standard models' assumption is that individuals discount future utility compared to present utility at a constant rate and, in that sense, they have consistent time preferences. This is due to the risk that the individual may die before the outcome materialises.
The other two fundamental assumptions of rational choice models are less crucial in the sense that alternative assumptions can be accommodated by such models with appropriate modifications. Selfishness -in the strictest possible sense -means that an individual's utility is independent of the utility of others. In a broader sense, an individual is still selfish if they are motivated by what can be termed as impure altruism, that is, emotional benefit or harm arising out of the utility or disutility of others. In the broadest sense, an individual's utility includes hedonic pleasure arising out of moral sentiments. 61 Finally, the assumption of unlimited willpower means that individuals will never knowingly act in a way which conflicts with their own preferences. 60 According to BV Gnedenko, Theory of Probability (BD Seckler trns, Chelsea Publishing, 1962), 16, 'a wide range of phenomena exists for which, whenever the set of conditions C is realised repeatedly, the proportion of occurrences of the event A only seldom deviates significantly from some average value and this number can thus serve as a characteristic index of the mass phenomenon' [emphasis original]. 61 In the latter sense, all rational behaviour is by definition selfish and therefore the assumption does not have any predictive value. For a discussion of self-interest, see Wilkinson and Klaes (above n 58), 393 -396.
| P a g e b. Modifying the standard model based on evidence from behavioural economics
Behavioural economics can be defined as a strand of scholarship that seeks to identify and classify phenomena that cannot be explained using the standard model described above with a view to 'improving the explanatory power of economic theories by giving them a sounder psychological basis'. 62 The 70 Gamblers tend to bet excessively on horses with a low probability to win. 71 Gamblers who have made large losses during a racing day tend to make very risky bets towards the end of the day as only these bets, if successful, allow them to return to the position they were at the beginning. to adopt a certain status quo (either their current state or some expected future state) as a reference point to assess whether the various outcomes they are asked to choose from (defined technically as prospects) represent a gain or a loss compared to their status quo. Loss aversion means that individuals tend to be much more averse to perceived losses than they are keen to achieve gains. As a result, as soon as an individual has incurred large losses compared to their reference point, they tend to become risk-seeking in a desperate attempt to return to that point.
Also attitude to risk depends on the perceived probability of gain or loss. Based on the available empirical evidence it appears that most individuals are risk-averse in relation to high and medium probability gains, risk-seeking in relation to small probability gains, risk-averse in relation to small probability losses and risk-seeking in relation to medium and large probability losses. 73 Furthermore, empirical evidence implies that the discount applied to future gains and losses grows as the gains or losses come further in the future, so that the function of future to present utility is mathematically a hyperbole. It follows that preferences are inconsistent over time and thus that individuals tend to be irrationally short-termist.
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The above analysis suggests that, in the absence of any form of performance-sensitive remuneration, corporate executives would be likely to refrain from taking optimal risks that engender a non-negligible probability of a very severe negative outcome -which includes, but is not limited to, the insolvency of the company in question. Indeed, they would stand nothing to gain from taking such risks, but would stand to suffer the risk of losing their position should to overestimate low and underestimate high probabilities in the case of negative events. See ND Weinstein, 'Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events ' (1980) 25 | P a g e the severely negative scenario materialise. Empirical evidence suggests that dismissal comes at a high cost for executives, as on top of the direct cost of searching for an alternative position they are likely to face a considerable period of unemployment and, when they do find alternative employment, it is usually at a significantly lower rate of pay. Indeed, a study found that a 1% increase in the dismissal risk of a CEO is associated with a 7% increase in the overall subjective value of the CEO's remuneration package, thus supporting the view that being dismissed is costly for CEOs. Behavioural analysis suggests that, in the context of decision making that can impact a company's insolvency risk, being dismissed would be perceived as a loss compared to current status quo. It follows that managers would tend to overestimate the probability of low probability losses and would thus refrain from taking risks that are desirable from the perspective of (risk-neutral) diversified shareholders.
The second area of behavioural economics that is crucial for the purposes of the present discussion is game theory and, in particular, the relationship between external and intrinsic incentives. Experiments that involve situations where cooperation is rationally desirable for both parties, such as the ultimatum game, 75 indicate that most individuals will refuse to cooperate (thus reducing their material wealth) in order to retaliate against what they perceive as unfair behaviour by the other party. Furthermore, experimental evidence suggests that 75 In ultimatum games, a sum that will be earned by the players only if they agree on how to distribute it amongst them. One player makes a one-off offer and the other can accept it or reject it. Rationally, it would make sense for the offeror to offer the other party a minimal amount and for the other party to accept. However, in reality a wide individuals tend to value their possessions irrationally high due to a feeling of entitlement and that if they feel entitled to a gain they are reluctant to share any part of it with others.
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An implication of the above is that creating external financial motives can remove intrinsic motives arising from social norms. 77 This observation has led some corporate law scholars to doubt the efficacy of performance-based remuneration. 78 From the viewpoint of the present discussion, this argument implies that regulatory rules such as the bonus cap are unlikely to have any effect on senior managers' behaviour and therefore are immaterial both from the perspective of finical stability and from the perspective of shareholder wealth.
However, the aforementioned studies focus on non-market contexts where strong social norms prevail and therefore it is too speculative to try to import their findings in the context of professional corporate managers. Indeed, empirical studies focusing on the labour market suggest that 'trust contracts' where the employer offers a high wage trusting the employee to perform well tend to perform very badly and make losses for both parties, whereas 'bonus contracts' where the employer reserves discretion to reward the employee if performance is good work much better. 79 This provides strong support for the effectiveness and of performance-based remuneration from the perspective of shareholders and hence for the potential significance of remuneration regulation as a tool to protect financial stability.
V. The reaction of major UK banks to the introduction of the bonus cap rule
The aim of this section is to document the reaction of UK banks to the bonus cap rule, which is necessary to assess whether the reform in question is likely to achieve its objective of enhancing financial stability. It is worth noting that based on the standard neoclassical model, as enriched by behavioural insights, one would expect the subjective value of executive remuneration packages in UK banks to remain unaffected by the introduction of the bonus cap rule. This is because the subjective value of remuneration packages depends on supply and demand in the managerial labour market. Still, the (objective) expected value of remuneration packages would be expected to reduce, due to risk aversion. In other words, as banks increase the fixed component and reduce the variable component of remuneration packages, the risk premium demanded by risk-averse senior managers reduces and hence a package with a lower expected value than before will have the same subjective value. Finally, it is reasonable to expect the maximum potential value of remuneration packages to reduce more steeply than expected value, in tandem with the reduction in variable remuneration.
All data is taken from the relevant banks' annual reports and accounts documents for The tables below summarise the structure of CEOs' remuneration packages and the actual and potential level of remuneration before and after the implementation of the bonus cap. 85 The years 2013 and 2014 were chosen because the former was the final year before the 81 In Tables 1, 2 and 3, Standard Chartered Bank plc is abbreviated as SCB. 82 The most important foreign bank operating in the UK retail market is currently Santander UK plc which is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Spanish bank Banco Santander SA. 83 For senior managers who are not board members the following pieces of information is disclosed by UK banks consistent with the relevant regulatory requirements: (a) the total number of employees whose remuneration exceeds £1 million; (b) the total remuneration of the five highest paid employees; and (c) the total remuneration and breakdown by component of the eight highest-paid senior executives. 84 It has been found that CEO remuneration is a significant but partial predictor of the level and structure of implementation of the bonus cap rule and the latter was the first year after its implementation and hence comparing between these two years illustrates the rule's impact. 'Actual remuneration' refers to the amount paid with respect to performance during a financial year even if it is subject to some performance conditions in the future. 'Potential remuneration' refers to the maximum amount of remuneration under the relevant component that the remuneration committee could have awarded for a given year based on the bank's remuneration policy. In the case of bonuses all banks set a maximum potential award and decide annually how much of that -if any -is to be awarded to each executive director. In the case of LTIPs, however, most banks simply make a set award which is a function of an executive's salary so that the incentivisation effect is only due to the nature of the payment, that is, in shares.
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>
As can be seen in Table 1 , UK banks had to make considerable changes to the structure of their executive remuneration packages to ensure that the ratio between fixed and variable components does not exceed the prescribed maximum. Their original position was one where the available variable remuneration was between 3.5 and 6 times the fixed components with the exception of RBS, which was already operating within the CRD IV imposed limit. This is probably attributable to the fact that the Treasury has had since 2009 a majority stake in RBS.
Indeed, RBS is the only UK major bank which has not yet sought shareholder approval to extend variable pay to 200 per cent of fixed pay following the procedures prescribed by the Directive. All other banks obtained such approval at the respective 2014 annual general meetings, and it is notable that the overwhelming majority of their shareholders voted in favour.
Conversely, many major banks have not made use of the possibility of benefiting from the Directive's discount rate, which appears to only have been utilised by RBS and Lloyds, possibly due to the very demanding deferral requirements in place for remuneration to qualify for the discount, and the modest rate of discount. With regard to the actual level of remuneration 30 | P a g e paid out the picture is mixed, with an increase in Barclays, and Lloyds, a small decrease in HSBC and a significant decrease in Standard Chartered and RBS.
<INSERT occasionally by increasing pension contributions and benefits in kind. It is notable that the bank which introduced the highest role-based allowance compared to CEO salary, HSBC, was also the bank that had to adapt its executive remuneration structure more to comply with the bonus cap. Thus, fixed pay allowances appear to operate as quasi-variable remuneration. Indeed, the use of fixed pay allowances can be explained as an attempt to maintain the pay performance sensitivity of executive remuneration packages despite the cap, as will be explained in the next part of the article.
<INSERT Table 3 represent the present value of the shares awarded to each CEO with respect to the relevant financial, subject to a vesting period of 3 to 5 years. These figures should not be confused with the actual value of shares that vest during a given financial year, which is the value included in the total annual remuneration figure provided by many banks. The effects of CRD IV are not yet fully visible with regard to the latter figure as the shares were awarded before the coming into force of the Directive, which only applies to remuneration earned from 2014 onwards.
From Tables 1, 2 and 3, we can calculate the substitution ratio of variable remuneration by fixed remuneration. This is the ratio of the increase in fixed remuneration to the decrease in maximum available variable remuneration. Expressed as a percentage, the substitution ratio was, in 2014, 27.7% in Barclays, 41.5% in HSBC, 123% in Lloyds, and 44.5% in SCB. In RBS, there was no increases in fixed remuneration in 2014, but there was in 2015 in which year the substitution ratio amounted to 69.4%. As explained at the beginning of this section, we would expect the increase in fixed pay to be lower than the reduction in the maximum potential variable pay, as the change makes the overall level of remuneration less subject to risk. This has two effects. First, executives will only need to be compensated for the expected value of the reduced variable components which is much less than their maximum potential value. Second, the change reduces the risk premium demanded by senior executives as a result of their risk aversion. The very high ratio in Lloyds is probably attributable to the bank's effective return to full private sector ownership during the relevant period and the consequent increase in overall remuneration of all types. The other banks' ratios are all considerably below 32 | P a g e 100% thus confirming the hypothesis that total available remuneration would decrease after the implementation of the bonus cap rule.
Overall, the examination of the response of major UK banks to the bonus cap rule reveals that overall levels of available remuneration have decreased in most banks, as expected due to the reduction of the element of risk in remuneration packages and that banks have sought to minimise the impact of the rule on incentives by introducing role-based allowances which are paid in shares. Of course, neither the expected value of remuneration packages nor their subjective value can be surmised from publicly available information on which the previous analysis is based. This could be explored by future empirical research.
VI. Evaluating the bonus cap rule from the perspective of financial stability
This part assesses the likely impact of the bonus cap rule on risk taking by financial institution senior managers and hence on financial stability. The discussion will challenge the Directive's core assumption, shared by some academic commentators, 89 that the total amount of available variable remuneration and its relative size to fixed remuneration are the main factors determining incentives to take decisions that increase financial institutions risk of failure. At this point a caveat is necessary. The analysis below is based on the remuneration structure of UK banks, which is based on the UK regulatory framework, and thus does not automatically apply to banks incorporated in other EU Member States. 90 A detailed examination of the effect of the bonus cap rule in other Member States is a very interesting line for future research, but evidently falls outside the scope of the discussion herein.
(a) Understanding how various forms of remuneration shape risk-taking incentives
It is essential to note that making part of executive remuneration dependent on performance conditions is not the only technique available to set incentives. Regular reviews of fixed pay levels with a view to increasing basic salary in line with the growth of the company's size or profitability is per se a mechanism that creates a financial incentive to pursue the maximisation of shareholder value or (as the case may be) the expansion of the relevant company's size.
More crucially, paying remuneration in shares or share options rather than cash is a powerful tool to set incentives. Share options have been demonstrated to produce perverse incentives to take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders as they reward strategies that increase a company's share price volatility. 91 As a result, they have become unpopular in recent years, and no major UK bank uses them at the time of writing. Awarding shares that vest in the future, however, is seen as a powerful tool to align the interests of senior managers with the interests of diversified shareholders and is heavily used in the UK. In the case of banks, at least 50% of variable remuneration must be paid in shares. 92 As was discussed in the previous part, fixed pay allowances are also paid in restricted shares by all major UK Banks. 34 | P a g e restricted shares ensures that over time a senior manager will always have a substantial number of shares vesting in any given year and therefore will have a sustained incentive to ensure that in any given year share prices are as high as possible. This is, of course, problematic from the perspective of financial stability as the level of risk that is optimal for shareholders is excessive from the perspective of the public interest.
In parallel, the power of boards and shareholders to remove senior management (strictly speaking CEOs and other executive directors, but this has knock-on effects on other senior managers) can also create incentives to take an optimal level of risk. Therefore, taking optimal risk (and thus assuming some risk of dismissal due to the company's increased insolvency risk)
can be the best strategy to minimise the chances of being dismissed. Let us then examine the incentives faced by bank senior managers with regard to taking decisions that they expect to maximise the bank's value, but which entail an increase in the risk of failure. Senior managers who follow optimally risky strategies will maximise the chances of receiving the highest possible level of variable remuneration, to the extent that the latter is sensitive to financial performance. 96 In addition, pursuing optimal strategies also maximises the value of any shares already held by senior managers, irrespective how they came to own them. It is also likely that pursuing optimally risky strategies will lead to an increase in basic salary in tandem with an increase in the company's size. The latter normally has a knock-on effect on future variable remuneration opportunity levels which are typically a function of an executive's basic salary. Finally, taking optimally risky decisions minimises a senior manager's the risk of dismissal by the board or failure of re-election by the shareholders in all cases except for the case that the risk actually leads to the bank's failure.
Conversely, the financial cost of pursuing optimally risky strategies for a hypothetical senior manager is as follows. If a given strategy leads to the failure of the relevant bank the senior manager in question will fail to earn any variable remuneration for the relevant financial year and will lose any unvested shares awarded in previous years as part of LTIPs, fixed-pay 94 See MS Weisbach, 'Outside Directors and CEO Turnover ' (1988) loss of the value of any vested shares owned at the time of insolvency. So, apart from encouraging risk taking, variable remuneration in banks also creates some incentives to avoid failure which are strengthened by the combined effect of regulatory rules, such as deferral periods, retention periods and claw-backs. It therefore follows that both the ratio between fixed and variable remuneration and the absolute amount of variable remuneration are not by 97 On the regulatory rules on variable remuneration deferral, see above n 21 and accompanying text. 98 On the regulatory rules on clawback, see above n 24 and accompanying text. 99 In Table 4 , the terms 'cost' and 'benefit' refer to the subjective value to senior managers of what they perceive to be the expected cost and benefit of a course of action.
themselves relevant factors, a finding that questions the utility of the bonus cap rule. That being said, the second and third of the benefits listed on Table 4 depend on pay-performance sensitivity, which might indeed have been reduced as a result of the implementation of the bonus cap rule, as will be explained below.
(b) Exploring the impact of the bonus cap rule on bank executives' incentives
The following paragraphs will explore the ways in which the bonus cap rule reduces payperformance sensitivity and thus works positively to enhance financial stability, but also the ways in which it reduces the cost of failure for senior management or removes incentives to act prudently, thus leading to negative unintended consequences.
Regarding the positive effects of the bonus cap, it has evidently reduced the size of potentially available bonuses and LTIPs, 101 thus reducing the amount of money at risk if performance targets are not met. This, of course, is only relevant to the extent that performance criteria are linked to profitability such as total shareholder return and earnings per share as such criteria incentivise behaviour that entails optimal risk taking from the shareholders'
perspective. In parallel, in view of the incentive effect created by payment in shares per se, the cap reduces the number of shares awarded as part of bonus and LTIP schemes to the extent that it reduces the potential size of these remuneration components. Of course, these benefits can be undermined if banks increase the elasticity of remaining variable remuneration components.
The latter technique entails making variable remuneration more steeply connected to performance which can compensate for the size of variable remuneration. For instance, a variable component that ranges from 0 to £1 million and will be £0.5 million for average performance and £1 million for top performance (amongst a selected basket of comparable companies) results in a similar level of elasticity as a package ranging from 0 to £0.5 million 101 As can be seen in Table 3 .
38 | P a g e that provides 0 for average performance and £0.5million for top performance, assuming they both increase at the same rate and that performance conditions in both cases are equally attainable. Of course, the difference would be that in the second case no incentives are created as soon as performance drops below average, so the overall incentive is not the exactly same.
Still, from the perspective of the present discussion it is important to note that making variable remuneration more sharply connected to financial performance can undermine the reduction of risk taking incentives achieved by the bonus cap rule.
Turning to the unintended consequences of the bonus cap, they mostly flow from undermining the positive effect of other regulatory rules such as the claw back rules. Indeed, reducing the size of variable remuneration reduces the amounts that can be clawed back in case of an adverse subsequent event. Also, reducing the potential size of variable remuneration reduces what executives stand to lose if they perform badly with respect to the relevant performance period. Furthermore, increasing the relative size of fixed remuneration compared to variable remuneration reduces banks' ability to make quick and large reductions of executive remuneration in case they face difficulties, thus increasing the total salary expenditure of ailing banks which in itself increases the risk of failure.
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Furthermore, unlike LTIP awards, fixed pay allowances are not subject to performance conditions during a vesting period, and cannot be clawed back in case of an adverse change in a bank' s financial position. This means that paying executives a given amount of money as a fixed pay share allowance creates powerful incentives to take risky decisions, in some cases even to act in a risk-seeking manner without the mitigating factors of the possibility to cancel vesting and claw back vested awards that exist in the case of LTIPs. In addition, if the amount of fixed pay allowances is reviewed more regularly than basic salaries to reflect the 102 On the views of the PRA, see above n 2 and accompanying text.
performance of the relevant bank (as appears to be part of the reason for introducing this new type of remuneration) this creates a further positive incentive to take risks that are optimal from the shareholders' perspective. This goes against the Directive's policy of removing incentives to increase banks' level of risk and is a clear manifestation of the phenomenon of adverse unintended consequences of regulatory measures.
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Indeed, behavioural economics insights suggest that paying part of (fixed or variable) remuneration in restricted shares can cause senior managers to act in a risk-seeking manner in certain circumstances thus creating perverse incentives to take risk that is excessive even for risk-neutral shareholders let alone for financial stability. The reason for this is the phenomenon of loss aversion and the observation that individuals tend to be risk-seeking with regard to high probability losses. This analysis requires us to appreciate that senior managers will adopt a given remuneration level as their reference point. In the case of remuneration paid in shares, this will probably be the value of the shares at the time of the award. If at the time of vesting the value of the shares has increased, this will be perceived as a gain and if it has decreased as a loss. So, an executive who shorty before the vesting time observes that the value of unvested shares has dropped significantly, will perceive this as a high probability loss and will be likely to take a very high level of risk, as only such risk taking can restore the value of the portfolio 103 The area of the regulation and governance of executive remuneration is one where unintended consequences are a frequent and serious phenomenon. For instance, the disclosure of levels of remuneration has arguably led to an increase of the overall levels of remunerations. See EM Matsumura and JY Shin, 'Corporate Governance
